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National Tax Journal, June 2010, 63 (2), 237–252

OPTIMAL SOLID WASTE TAX POLICY WITH
CENTRALIZED RECYCLING
Thomas C. Kinnaman

Economic models have demonstrated the efficiency of curbside collection taxes. This
paper demonstrates that such efficiencies disappear in economies with centralized
recycling options — where recyclable materials can be removed from the waste
stream either by households or at a centralized recycling facility. In such economies,
a curbside garbage tax not only fails to encourage the centralized recycler to internalize the external costs of waste disposal, but introduces inefficiencies to the costminimizing mix of household and centralized recycling efforts. The optimal waste
policy is a tax assessed further downstream at the landfill rather than at the curb.
Keywords: environmental taxation, solid waste policy
JEL Codes: H2, H7, Q5

I. INTRODUCTION
ncentive-based environmental policies such as tradable permits and pollution taxes
have grown in prominence over the past 25 years. Legislation to reduce lead in gasoline, to phase out CFC’s, to reduce sulfur oxides, and most recently to reduce carbon
dioxide in Europe have all featured tradable permits. Although certain carbon emission
taxes have been enacted in British Columbia, France, and Scandinavia, curbside taxes
on the collection of residential solid waste are perhaps the most common application of
emission taxes. Curbside taxes have been implemented in 4,000 municipalities in the
United States1 and are also widespread in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy,
The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. South Korea requires all of its municipalities to
assess curbside fees for waste collection.
Based on efficiency arguments, economists have generally supported the implementation of such curbside taxes for households to internalize all costs of disposing their
waste (Repetto et al., 1992; Miranda et al., 1994; Porter, 2002). Such fees encourage

I

1

See “Unit-Based Pricing in the United States: A Tally of Communities.” United States Environmental
Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/waste/conserve/tools/payt/states/comminfo.htm.
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households to recycle optimally and thus reduce waste efficiently without facing
behavioral mandates. Residential waste has been estimated to decrease by two to15
pounds-per-household per week in response to a curbside tax of $1 per 30-gallon can.2
Possible increases in illegal dumping (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Kim, Chang and
Kelleher, 2008) and the high administrative costs of assessing curbside taxes (Kinnaman, 2006) are potential drawbacks of curbside taxation.
This paper suggests a third possible problem with curbside waste taxes. Such taxes
are found to introduce two inefficiencies in an economy endowed with technologies to
separate recyclable materials from the general waste stream at a centralized separating facility. First, curbside taxes distort the cost-minimizing mix of recycling efforts
between individual households and centralized facilities. Second, curbside taxes do
not create price incentives for centralized recycling facilities to internalize the external costs of waste disposal. The previous literature assumed that only households
possessed technologies for separating recyclable materials from the mixed waste
stream.
The model below will demonstrate that the optimal policy in an economy with
centralized recycling options is a tax assessed not at the curb but further down the
waste stream at the landfill. The landfill tax encourage centralized recyclers to make
efficient decisions regarding the amount to remove from the waste stream and allows
for vertical equality of marginal costs between household and centralized recycling
efforts. The other advantage of the landfill tax, as is the case with the curbside tax
in economies without centralized recycling, is the elimination of all other policies
designed to alter household disposal decisions such as mandatory recycling laws,
deposit-refund systems, and banning materials from landfills. One tax does the
job.
Centralized recycling technologies are utilized in many parts of the developed
world, especially in Japan and portions of northern Europe and the United States.
Labor-intensive versions of a centralized recycling system feature workers extracting
recyclable materials by hand from a slow moving conveyor belt. Capital intensive versions include the use of magnets to extract ferrous metals, air classifiers with blowers
to separate light plastics, and eddy-current separators with magnets to push aluminum
into separation bins. According to a national survey of randomly selected municipal
recycling programs conducted in 1997 and described in Folz (1999), roughly 44 percent
of municipalities in the sample separate recyclable materials in centralized facilities.
These municipalities recycle an average of 18.6 percent of their waste materials, slightly
higher than the 15.5 percent recycling rate reported by municipalities without centralized
recycling facilities. As labor costs rise and separation technologies improve, the portion
of household materials separated for recycling at centralized facilities may increase in the
future.
Sections II and III of this paper present the economic model of the waste market with
and without centralized recycling. Section IV discusses the empirical implications of
the model, and is followed by a short conclusion.
2

Kinnaman (2006) and the references therein summarize the empirical estimates. For perspective, the average household generates roughly 50 pounds of waste per week in the absence of curbside taxation.
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II. NO CENTRALIZED RECYCLING
To introduce notation and characterize prior results, this section develops a model
where only households possess recycling technologies as a centralized recycling
option does not exist. Assume a representative household gains utility (u) from its own
consumption of a composite commodity good (c) and experiences disutility from the
aggregate quantity of disposed waste (D),
(1)

u = u(c, D), where uc > 0 and uD < 0.

Each unit of consumption (c) generates one unit of waste. Each unit of waste can
either be separated by the household for curbside recycling collection (r) or remain in
a mixed state (m) for collection and disposal in a landfill. Thus,
(2)

c = r + m.

Separating waste materials for recycling requires the employment of a household
resource such as labor (kh) according to the household recycling production function r =
σ (kh), where σ ′ > 0 and σ ″ < 0. This function can be inverted to explicitly solve for kh
(3)

kh = h(r), where hʹ > 0 and hʺ > 0.

A representative waste collection firm employs labor to remove separated waste (requiring kr) and mixed waste (requiring km) according to the inverted production functions3
(4a) kr = r(r), where rʹ > 0 and rʺ > 0
(4b)

km = m (m), where mʹ > 0 and mʺ > 0.

A representative production firm uses labor (kc) and recycled waste materials (r) to
produce the composite commodity good according to the production function
(5)

c = f(kc, r), where, fk > 0, fr > 0, fkk < 0, and frr < 0.

In this version of the model, all mixed waste collected from households is disposed
at a landfill (d), thus m = d. The landfill uses labor in the disposal process.
(6)

kd = d(d), where d′ > 0 and d″ > 0.

The aggregate quantity of waste is D = nd, where n is the number of representative
households in the economy. Labor is fully employed at a fixed kˉ (thus assuming no
choice over labor and leisure ), thus
(7)
3

kˉ = kh + kr + km + kc + kd.

These production functions could involve either a constant or decreasing marginal product of labor to
achieve the market equilibriums discussed below.
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A. Social Planner
A social planner maximizes household utility (1) subject to constraints (2) through
(7), m = d, and D = nd. Upon substitution, the planner chooses the quantity of separated
household waste (r) and disposed waste (d) to maximize
L = u(r + d, nd) + λ{ f [kˉ – h(r) – r(r) – m(d) – d(d), r] – r – d},
where λ is the marginal utility of increasing the production of the composite commodity
good. The first-order conditions are4
(8a) Lr: uc /λ = fkh′ + fkr′ – fr + 1
(8b)

Ld: uc /λ = fkm′ + fkd′ + 1 – nuD /λ.

Setting these two conditions equal to each other and simplifying implies the socially
optimal allocation of waste and recycling can be characterized by the marginal condition
(9)

m′ + d′ – nuD /λ fk = h′ + r′ – fr / fk.

Optimality requires the full social marginal cost of waste disposal to be equal to the
full social marginal cost of recycling. The full social marginal cost of waste disposal is
comprised of the marginal cost to collect the waste (m′), the marginal cost to dispose
of the waste (d′), and the household disutility experienced from all disposed waste
(measured in units of labor per unit of waste disposal). The marginal cost of recycling
is comprised of the marginal cost for the household to separate the waste (h′) plus the
marginal cost to the waste company to collect the separated material (r′) less the productive benefit of the recycled material in producing the composite commodity good. The
next section explores the conditions necessary for a decentralized economy to obtain
this social optimum.
B. Decentralized Competitive Economy
Assume both a curbside disposal tax (tm) and landfill tax (td) are available to social
planners to enable waste generators to internalize the social costs of disposal. Each
representative household in a decentralized market economy maximizes its own utility
(1) subject to the materials balance constraint (2), the household separating production
function (3) and the budget constraint.
(kˉ – kh)w + prr = c + ( pm + tm)m.
4

A unique solution is assumed to be internal and second-order conditions are assumed to hold (Baumol and
Oates, 1988).
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The household earns income from allocating its endowment of labor (less that used to
separate recyclable materials) to the labor market in exchange for wage w and revenue
earned from the curbside collection of their separated recycled materials ( pr, which can
be negative if separated materials have no economic value to producers of the composite
good). The household spends this income on the composite good (the numeraire good
with price pc = 1 per unit) and for the collection of mixed waste ( pm per unit plus the
curbside disposal tax tm).
Because n is large, each representative household does not internalize the externality
associated with its own waste generation, and instead considers D to be exogenously
determined. The household chooses the quantity of their waste to separate for recycling
(r) and the quantity to remain mixed (m) to maximize
L = u(r + m, D) + δ [wkˉ – wh(r) + prr – (r + m) – ( pm + tm)m] ,
where δ is the marginal utility of household income. The first-order conditions are
Lr: uc /δ = wh′ – pr + 1
Lm: uc /δ = 1 + pm + tm.
Combining these, the household maximizes utility by satisfying the marginal condition
(10)

wh′ = pr + pm+ tm.

The household devotes resources to recycling until the marginal opportunity cost (wh′)
is equal to the marginal benefit — the price received for separated materials plus the
after tax savings from not disposing those materials as waste.
A waste collection firm earns revenue from collecting mixed waste from households
(at pm per unit) and from selling separated materials to the producers of the composite
good (at price ps). Costs are comprised of payments to households for collecting separated recycled materials ( pr, which once again can be negative), payment to landfills
for waste disposal (at pd per unit disposed), and costs to employ labor to collect both
separated and mixed wastes at the curb

π = pmm + psr – prr – pdm – wr(r) – wm(m).
Profit is maximized by choosing the amount of mixed waste (m) and recycled waste
(r) to collect subject to the production functions (4a) and (4b), and the constraint that m
= d (all collected mixed waste is disposed at the landfill). The first-order conditions are
(11a) πm: wm′ = pm – pd
(11b)

πr: wr′ = ps – pr.
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The collector chooses quantities such that the marginal cost of collecting mixed and
separated waste equal their respective marginal benefits.
The producer of the composite commodity good earns revenue from the sale of the
numeraire composite good (c with price equal to 1), pays w for each unit of labor (kc),
and pays the collector for separated recyclable materials ( ps). It maximizes profit

π = c – wkc – psr
subject to the production function (5) by setting fk = w and fr = ps. Combining these
conditions yields
(12)

fk / w = fr /ps.

Profit is maximized by choosing inputs such that the ratios of the marginal product and
the marginal cost of each input are equal.
Finally, the landfill operator chooses the quantity of mixed waste (m = d) to accept
for disposal to maximize profit

π = ( pd – td)d – wkd,
subject to the production function (6). The waste disposal firm pays a tax on each unit
of waste accepted for disposal (td). Profit is maximized when
(13)

wd′ = pd – td.

Substituting (11a) and (11b) into (10) to eliminate pm and pr and then substituting
(12) and (13) into the resulting equation to eliminate ps and pd yields
(14)

m′ + d′ + (tm /w + td /w) = h′ + r′ – fr /fk.

The social optimum can be achieved in the decentralized economy by setting the garbage collection tax (tm) and/or the landfill tax (td) such that (14) is identical to (9). The
optimal tax policy, upon substituting fk = w from the producer’s profit-maximization
problem above satisfies the condition
(15)

t*m + t*d = – nuD /λ.

A tax of –nuD /λ can be assessed at the curb (tm > 0, td = 0), at the landfill (tm = 0,
td > 0), or any linear combination of the two taxes such that (15) is satisfied. If administrative costs are associated with implementing either tax, then the optimal policy would
involve selecting the single tax (tm or td) that involves the fewest administrative costs.
Because the number of households far exceeds the number of landfills, administrative
costs may be lower for the landfill tax than the curbside tax. Otherwise, there is nothing
in the model to support favoring one tax approach over the other.
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Controlling for changes in notation and a few other details of this model, the curbside
tax rate (tm > 0, td = 0) is similar to optimal tax rates found in the existing literature — a
literature that does not consider landfill taxation.5 The magnitude of the optimal tax
increases with the magnitude of the externality (nuD, which is negative), and decreases
with increases in the marginal utility of production (λ).6
III. HOUSEHOLD AND CENTRALIZED SEPARATION OPTIONS
Assume now that the representative waste collecting firm employs labor (ks) and a
technology to separate household waste (m) for recycling at a centralized recycling
facility (with quantity s) according to the inverted production function
(16) k s = s(s), where s′ > 0 and s″ > 0.
The remainder of the mixed waste is taken to the landfill. Thus, instead of m = d,
we have
(17)

m = s + d.

A. Social Optimum
The social planner chooses r, d, and s to maximize utility (1) subject to constraints
(2) through (7), where (7) now includes ks, the requirement that D = nd, and (16) and
(17). The Lagrange function is
L = u(r + s + d, nd) + λ{ f [kˉ – h(r) – r(r) – m(s + d) – s(s) – d (d), r + s] – r – s – d},
where λ once again is the marginal utility of producing one additional unit of the composite commodity good. The first-order conditions are
(18a=8a) Lr: uc /λ = fkh′ + fkr′ – fr + 1
(18b=8b)

Ld: uc /λ = fkm′ + fkd′ + 1 – nuD/λ

(18c) Ls: uc /λ = fks′ + fkm′ – fr + 1.
The first and second conditions are identical to those above. Combining (18a) and
(18b) to eliminate uc /λ yields the same marginal condition given in (9) above, which
5

6

This literature includes Miedema (1983), Dobbs (1991), Dinan (1993), Palmer and Walls (1994), Fullerton
and Kinnaman (1995), and most recently Ferrara (2008).
This model does not include virgin materials as a substitute in production for recycled materials. Fullerton
and Kinnaman (1995) demonstrate that the addition of virgin materials to a general equilibrium model
does not alter the optimal tax rate for waste.
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is restated as (19a) below. Combining (18a) and (18c), and then (18b) and (18c) yields
two additional conditions for the social optimum
(19a=9) m′ + d′ – nuD /λfk = h′ + r′ – fr /fk
(19b)

h′ + r′ = m′ + s′

(19c) s′ – fr /fk = d′ – nuD /λfk.
As above, optimality condition (19a) equates the full social marginal costs of curbside
waste disposal and curbside recycling. Condition (19b) equates the full marginal cost
of household recycling and the full marginal cost of centralized recycling. The former
is comprised of the marginal cost to the household to separate the waste (h′) plus the
marginal cost to the waste collector to collect the separated waste (r′). The latter is
comprised of the marginal cost to the collector to collect mixed waste (m′) plus the
marginal cost to separate that waste at the centralized recycling facility (s′). The final
optimality condition (19c) equates the full social marginal cost of recycling the material at the centralized facility with the full social marginal cost of disposing the material. Centralized recycling incurs a marginal cost (s′) but generates raw materials for
production (fr /fk). Disposal involves a marginal cost (d′) and a direct loss in household
utility.
B. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
The optimal tax policy now has to satisfy three conditions, rather than just one. Consider once again the two tax policies available to policy makers to allow decentralized
economic agents to reach the social optimum, a curbside tax on waste collection (tm)
and a waste tax levied at the landfill (td).
The household faces the identical problem as above and therefore maximizes utility according to (10). The household separates waste until the marginal resource cost
is equal to the curbside (after tax) price of waste plus the price received for recycled
materials.7 Likewise the profit maximizing behavior of the firm producing the composite
good is identical to the conditions given in (12) above. The landfill also faces the same
problem as above and maximizes profit when (13) is satisfied.
The waste collector/processor once again earns revenue from selling recycled materials
(at price ps) to the representative producer. But the recycled materials are now separated
either by the household (r) or the centralized recycling facility (s), and are assumed
to be perfect substitutes in the production of the composite good. As above, the waste
7

Notice private waste haulers may choose to charge households a positive market per-bag price at the curb
for waste collection if pm > 0. The implication of the private decision to charge a monthly fee ( pm = 0) or
a per-bag fee ( pm > 0) on efficient outcomes is discussed in the next section below.
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collector/processor earns revenue from collecting mixed waste from the household
( pm), pays pr to the household for separated waste (r), pays the landfill pd to dispose
non-separated waste (d), and pays w for labor to collect mixed waste (km), to collect
separated waste (kr) and now to separate waste at the centralized recycling facility (kp).
The waste collector’s problem is to maximize profit

π = ps(r + s) + pm(d + s) – prr – pdd – wr(r) – wm(d + s) – ws(s),
where m = d + s. The first order conditions are now
(20a=11a) πd: wm′ = pm – pd
(20b=11b)

πr: wr′ = ps – pr

(20c) πs: wm′ + ws′ = ps + pm.
The first two of these conditions are identical to the profit-maximizing conditions
above. The third condition suggests the collector/processor separates mixed waste (m)
and the centralized recycling facility such that the marginal cost (wm′ to collect the
mixed waste plus ws′ to separate the mixed waste) is equal to the marginal revenue (the
price paid by producers for the separated materials plus the price paid by household to
collect mixed waste).
The decentralized equilibrium is completely represented by (10), (12), (13), and
(20a-20c). Upon substitution, this system of six equations is reduced to
(21a) wh′ + wr′ = pm + wfr /fk + tm
(21b)

wm′ + wd′ = pm – td

(21c) wm′ + ws′ = pm + wfr /fk .
Combining first (21a) and (21b), then (21a) and (21c) and finally (21b) and (21c) to
eliminate pm yields the three conditions
(22a) m′ + d′ + td /w + tm/w = h′ + r′ – fr /fk
(22b)

h′ + r′ = m′ + s′+ tm /w

(22c) s′ – fr /fk = d′ + td /w.
The social optimum is achieved when these three conditions are equivalent to (19a),
(19b), and (19c). Two tax instruments, tm and td, are once again available.
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C. The Landfill Tax (td > 0, tm = 0)
Consider a tax levied not at the curb, but at the landfill. The single landfill tax can
achieve all three of the optimal marginal conditions defined above. To see this, first
compare (19a) and (22a). The optimal tax is
(23)

t*d = –nuD / λ ,

which is the same tax rate assessed at the landfill in an economy without centralized
recycling technology (in Section II above). Even though the household does not explicitly
pay a curbside tax, the optimal landfill tax may cause the collector/processor to increase
the curbside price of waste collection, a decision examined in Section IV below.
Next, compare (19b) and (22b) and note that the decentralized equilibrium satisfies
the optimality condition. The landfill tax does not appear in this condition, and thus a
positive landfill tax does not distort the waste collector/processor’s efficient decision
between collecting separated waste from households and separating the waste themselves. This decision is instead governed in a decentralized economy by the marginal
costs of each option.
Finally, compare (19c) and (22c) and note that the tax necessary to achieve optimal
condition (22c) is once again the optimal tax rate given in (23). A single landfill tax
encourages both the optimal recycle/landfill decisions by collector/processors and
optimal separating decisions by households. The landfill tax causes waste collecting/
processing firms to internalize the social costs of landfill disposal while at the same
time causing those firms to increase the price of collecting non-separated waste from
households.
D. The Curbside Waste Tax (tm > 0, td = 0)
Recall that the existing economic literature suggests a curbside waste tax (tm) allows
a decentralized economy to achieve the efficient allocation of resources when illegal
dumping is not a factor. The optimal curbside tax of t*m = –nuD /λ is necessary for (22a)
to equal (19a). The waste-producing household internalizes the waste externality and
accordingly chooses the optimal quantities of mixed and separated waste.
But the social optimum condition (19b) can only be satisfied when tm = 0. Profit
maximizing collectors/recyclers choose between household and centralized separation
methods and reach equilibrium when the marginal costs of both options are equal. A
positive curbside tax distorts this equilibrium and causes households to inefficiently
separate waste that could be separated at the processing facility at lower cost. In the
long run, the curbside tax could delay the natural development of a centralized recycling
industry because the tax reduces the recycled materials available in mixed waste streams.
Once mixed materials have been collected from households, optimality condition
(19c) implies the marginal cost of separating materials at the centralized facility should
be equal to the marginal social cost of disposal. A curbside waste tax is powerless to
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internalize disposal costs to centralized recyclers (it does not appear in (22c)), and
therefore a policy approach relying only on curbside taxes yields too little centralized
recycling and too much disposal.
To summarize, although the curbside waste tax induces households to make efficient
waste disposal decisions, two inefficiencies are introduced with centralized recycling.
First, curbside taxes unnecessarily distort the process of material separation in favor
of households over centralized recyclers. Second, curbside taxes are too far upstream
to internalize the social costs of disposal for centralized recycling firms.
E. Both Tax Policies (tm > 0, td > 0)
Recall in Section II above that any linear combination of the two available tax policies satisfying (15) leads to the efficient quantities of waste and recycling. This result
does not carry through to the case of centralized recycling. The curbside tax (tm) must
be zero for the full marginal cost of household recycling to equal the full marginal cost
of centralized recycling. Furthermore the landfill tax (td) must alone equal the left hand
side of (15) to equate the full social marginal cost of recycling the material at the centralized facility with the full social marginal cost of disposing the material. Curbside taxes
must therefore be zero and landfill taxes set equal to the full external costs of waste in
economies with centralized recycling technologies.
IV. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The optimal tax rate on waste disposed at the landfill as modeled above is equal to
the external marginal cost of waste collection and disposal (–nuD /λ). External costs of
waste collection include road congestion and the increased likelihood of vehicle accidents from waste trucks. Waste disposed in landfills can cause odor and unsightliness,
threaten local ground water supplies, and contribute to climate change by emitting
methane. Incinerators also release climate change gases, diminish local air quality, and
generate hazardous ashes.
A few economic papers have estimated these external costs. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004), for example, estimate that external costs are $4.87 per ton for landfill
disposal and $20.58 per ton for incineration.8 Kinnaman (2006) estimates external costs
at $5.76–$9.38 per ton of waste disposed at landfills, where the higher value pertains
to remote rural landfills that require lengthy transportation routes and to landfills that
do not capture methane for electricity production. Isely and Lowen (2007) estimate
external costs at $5.48 per ton for landfill disposal. Of these three, only the Kinnaman
(2006) estimate includes the external costs of waste transportation — estimated at 58
cents to $1.93 per ton (Davies and Doble, 2004). Based upon these three estimates, the
optimal landfill tax appears to fall in the $5–10 per ton range. The optimal incineration
tax could be over $20 per ton.
8

All estimated external costs cited in this paragraph have been adjusted to 2010 dollars.
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Landfill taxes are common in many parts of the developed world. In the United
States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 allocated to the
individual states the authority to regulate solid waste. Twenty states have implemented
landfill taxes ranging from 25 cents per ton in Hawaii to $8 per ton in New Jersey (Kinnaman, 2006). Landfill taxes in the United States average $2.22 per ton — a bit lower
than the estimated external marginal costs of waste collection and disposal cited above.
Internationally, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France, and Sweden have also
implemented landfill taxes.
Recall that the landfill or incineration tax, if set at an efficient level, internalizes all
costs of disposal, and all other policies designated to promote recycling or discourage
waste are unnecessary and produce inefficiencies. In virtually all cases of existing landfill
taxes, both internationally and in the United States, governments have also imposed an
assortment of other policies such as mandatory recycling ordinances, required recycled
content standards in production, an assortment of subsidies to promote recycling, producer responsibility laws, and deposit-refund schemes. These additional policy measures
are unnecessary if landfill taxes are set efficiently.
To advocates of curbside waste pricing, an interesting empirical question is whether
or not the implementation of a landfill tax will affect a local garbage collector’s curbside
pricing strategy. Two broad pricing options are available. First, a collector can charge
households a flat fee for unlimited use of its waste collection services. Under this pricing
scheme, the marginal cost to the household of contributing an additional unit of waste
is zero ( pm = 0). Or the collector can instead measure the household’s waste and charge
according to the weight or volume ( pm > 0). The profit-maximizing waste collector selects
unit pricing over the flat fee only if the private benefits of doing so exceed the private costs.
The private benefits of employing unit pricing ( pm > 0) are illustrated in Figure 1,
where the quantity of mixed waste collected is measured along the horizontal axis.
Household demand for collection services is derived from the consumption it supports,
and is labeled D in Figure 1. The private marginal cost (PMC) of waste collection and
disposal is, by the assumptions of the model above, equal to w(w′ + d′). Because of
assumed diminishing marginal returns in these two production processes, both m′ and d′
increase with the quantity of waste collected. Households generate m0 units in response
to a fixed monthly fee ( pm = 0). The market-equilibrium curbside price of p1 reduces
the quantity of waste generated by households from m0 to m1. The private benefit to the
waste collector/processor from charging this price is illustrated by area A in Figure 1.
But to capture these benefits, collection/processor firms must develop a technology to
monitor each household’s unique waste contribution. Options could include universal
product codes on waste containers, fitting scales on garbage trucks to weigh garbage, or
issuing special bags, stickers, or tags to each household. Collectors must also take the
time to monitor each household’s waste contribution, and in some cases individualized
bills must be sent to each customer. Assume the administrative cost of these efforts is
TC. The profit-maximizing waste collector will adopt unit pricing only if A > TC. The
outcome of this condition could vary across municipalities.
The implementation of the optimal landfill tax increases the private marginal cost of
waste collection and disposal. The optimal price for waste collection increases from p1
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Figure 1
The Total Benefits of Curbside Pricing
$/unit
D
SMC = w(mʹ+dʹ) + t d*

PMC = w(mʹ+dʹ)

B
P2
P1
A

m2

m1

m0

Mixed Waste (m)

to p2, household waste generation decreases from m1 to m2, and the benefits of implementing unit pricing to the collector increase from area A to area A + B. The landfill tax
will encourage the collector/processor to implement curbside pricing if A + B > TC > A.
Fixed monthly fees will be levied under a landfill tax if A + B < TC. Because the collector/processor paying the landfill tax internalizes all social benefits and administrative
costs of each pricing strategy, its profit-maximizing decisions will be efficient. The lack
of a curbside price is not evidence of inefficient pricing policies or of market failure.
The empirical economics literature has estimated this effect — how an increase in
landfill disposal costs (tipping fees) affect the likelihood of adopting curbside pricing
strategies. Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) estimate that a $1 per ton increase in landfill disposal costs increases the probability a local waste collector implements per-bag
pricing by only 0.78 percent. Extrapolating from those results, a $10 increase in landfill
disposal fees (the upper bound of the estimates of external marginal cost of waste collection and disposal) increases the likelihood of per-bag pricing by 7.8 percent. Among
those localities that have implemented per-bag pricing, Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000)
find a $1 increase in landfill disposal costs increases the curbside fee by 3.5 cents per
bag — suggesting a $10 increase would increase curbside fees by 35 cents per bag.
Tawil (1995) also estimates the probability of adopting curbside pricing increases with
economic variables such as disposal fees.9
9

In a related question, Kinnaman (2006) finds no empirical relationship between the landfill cost of disposal
and the likelihood that local collectors offer curbside recycling to households.
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A final empirical question is the effect of a positive curbside price on household
disposal behavior. In response to a curbside price of $1 per 30-gallon bag, existing
estimates suggest that households reduce garbage by between one to 10 pounds per
week — roughly 2–20 percent of a household’s waste (Kinnaman, 2006). Fullerton
and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that 28 percent of the reduction of garbage observed
at the curb from the implementation of curbside pricing may be redirected to illicit or
illegal forms of disposal.
V. CONCLUSION
The states of Wisconsin and Washington require their municipalities to implement curbside taxes, and internationally South Korea requires all municipalities to
implement curbside taxes. The model presented in this paper suggests landfill and
incineration taxes should replace such local curbside taxes when centralized recycling
technologies are available. Where centralized recycling technologies do not exist,
the landfill tax preserves the efficiency properties of the curbside tax and removes a
barrier to the eventual emergence of centralized recycling facilities. Local waste collectors may choose to price garbage at the curb if the benefits of doing so exceed the
costs.
The conclusions of the model can easily be extended to demonstrate that other solid
waste policies directed at households are also inefficient with centralized recycling technologies. For example, much of the economics literature on optimal waste policy cited
above advocates deposit-refund programs where households face opportunities for illegal
dumping. As is the case with the curbside tax, the efficiency of deposit-refund programs
where refunds for recyclable materials are paid directly to households is preserved only
in economies with no centralized recycling technologies. With centralized recycling
programs, refunds must be paid to centralized recyclers to avoid the two inefficiencies
discussed above. Centralized recyclers internalize the social costs of disposal with the
recycling refund and the optimal allocation of separation efforts between households
and centralized recyclers is preserved.
Finally, many municipalities, both internationally and in the United States, collect
household mixed waste and separated recyclable materials using public municipal
resources. In principle, the landfill tax causes public agencies to internalize the social
costs of landfill disposal as described above. However, the likelihood that the landfill
tax would lead to optimal curbside pricing following the logic of Figure 1 would be
reduced if the public agency pursues goals other than cost minimization.
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